What Is Social Constructionism? In Contemporary Social Constructionism

What I read

In this book, the author aims to “put to rest” the fear that social constructionism threatens the foundation of social science, and argues that it is a positive feature of all social science research. The first chapter of the book attempts to describe what social constructionism is in a neutral manner. The author works to accomplish this by first describing social constructionists who attempted to elevate their own ideas above the social forces that govern others, as though their ideas have an objective lens on the world. He then analyzes the “principle of symmetry” where responsible scientists must view all parts of an argument equally, and the “practice turn” where social constructionists began to view the context in which ideas actually come to bear as important to the ideas themselves. The author then introduces the idea of “reflexivity,” arriving at what he considers to be the distinctive value of social constructionism.

Social constructionism has roots in a variety of intellectual movements. It began with a set of perspectives related to classification through anthropology (Durkheim), subjectivity in social science as a legitimate space of study (Weber), and the relationship of social structures to forms of power and politics (Marx); this then led to the fundamental and “monumental” idea that “called for the sociological analysis of all knowledge (except natural science) as socially embedded and constructed.”

Some social scientists built on or critiqued these foundations; others built on another foundation, one advanced by pragmatists like Dewey and Pierce. This was a view that emphasized creative agency and the idea that “the human experience of the world is always mediated by the socially inherited meanings actors actively confer in it.” The author views this foundation as supporting the idea of “ethnomethodology,” of viewing historic activities as an academic dialogue emerging in situ. The author introduces the program of “sociology of scientific knowledge” as an attempt to add scientifically-recognized rigor (and therefore, credibility) to a study of society; this presents science as a socially-interested activity, and therefore as one that is socially constructed—that the “creative inclinations of scientists themselves” is at the core of scientific paradigms.

This discussion then leads to the historical “practice turn” as a pivotal point for social science to move from abstract considerations to the manifestation of these considerations in the built world. This, again, builds on the pragmatist idea of improving the human condition rather than transcending it: our ideas need to have real and pragmatic relevance to the richness of life. These ideas were temporarily set aside during the science and technology-driven energy of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, yet have returned as a fundamental part of social constructionism; the ideas provide a criteria for assessing social science practice, as “it is only under the specific conditions of their practical use that we may judge” our ideas. People know different things at different times, and so they interpret the world differently. This is social constructionism in practice.

The author describes “reflexivity” as a logical progression of practice, as ideas exist in a socio-economic, historical context. He argues that social constructionist perspectives should account for this as real, meaningful context; he then concludes that ideas of technology, science, and any other phenomenon can’t be separated from the human-built world in which they exist—and this extends to social science itself.