Paper Summaries
Entrepreneurial Subject
Neoliberalism

November 7, 2026 | 3 minute read

The Birth of Biopolitics: Lecture from March 14, 1979

by Michel Foucault

Summary

In this text (a transcription of a talk), the author describes the nature of neoliberalism as an economic theory that treats a worker as an enterprise, rather than as a raw unit of labor.

Traditional economic theories have ignored the nature of labor beyond characterizing it as a passive unit. The author argues that economic explorations have treated land, capital and labor as requirements for production, but have not investigated the human nature of labor; it has been “neutralized” into a quantitative, measurable value (primarily with a focus on time and efficiency). This has overly abstracted labor into a mechanism. Neoliberalism demands a more rigorous exploration of labor as a person: “to bring labor into the field of economic analysis, we must put ourselves in the position of the person who works; we will have to study work as economic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized, and calculated by the person who works” (223). This foregrounds the person, turning them into “an economic subject” (223) that leverages choice and rationality to conduct work. The worker is not a passive object; they are “an active economic subject” (223).

When viewed from the worker’s point of view, labor is understood as an ability or a skill. A person can be viewed as a machine that generates a stream of earnings. Capital is the ability to generate earnings, and as a person is the machine of capital production, it is “inseparable from the person who possess it… ability to work, skill, the ability to do something cannot be separated from the person who is skilled and who can do this particular thing” (224). The author explains that this is a view of labor as productivity: “the worker is a machine, but a machine understood in the positive sense, since it is a machine that produces an earnings stream” (224). As the worker is the machine (and has a skill and rationality of production), “the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself” (225).

As with other forms of economic theory, there is argued to be an exchange, but here the exchange is as an entrepreneur—“an entrepreneur of himself” (226), existing as a self-contained mechanism for producing and earning. Human capital is an “ability-machine” (226). To optimize the machine, neoliberalism argues for investment in self: care between a parent and children, care through education, and care through health and public hygiene. Migration is another form of investment in improvement, as it allows for a broader set of income opportunities by bringing the machine to the place of exchange; it is a behavior of a machine, optimizing itself.

Additionally, optimization of the machine occurs through innovation. Following Schumpeter, the author argues this is “the discovery of new techniques, sources, and forms of productivity… if we find new things, discover new forms of productivity, and make technological innovations, this is nothing other than the income of a certain capital, of human capital, that is to say, of the set of investments we have made at the level of man itself” (231). Innovation is an investment in optimization of a machine of self.

Neoliberalism argues that, as a state, a policy of growth is one that invests in human capital by affording a person the opportunities for machine-like optimization; historical analysis provides evidence that, in the United States, vibrant economic growth can be attributed to this form of human capital optimization.

A brief inclusion of the March 21, 1979 lecture (which focuses almost entirely on crime):

The author makes very explicit that the discussion of a neoliberal subject is one of homo economicus, not of actual social behavior: “Considering the subject as homo economicus does not imply an anthropological identification of any behavior whatsoever with economic behavior.” This does present the subject as governable (“governmentalizable”), but the author makes explicit that a rational, economic individual “is the interface of government and the individual. But this does not mean that every individual, every subject is an economic man” (252-253).